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DWORKIN AS AN ORIGINALIST 
Jeffrey Goldsworthy* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ronald Dworkin is regarded as one of the leading critics of 
originalism in constitutional interpretation. But he has recently 
undergone something of a conversion, and now apparently en-
dorses a version of originalism. 
In his latest writings, he draws a distinction between "se-
mantic" and "expectation" intentions.1 Semantic intentions are 
what people intend to say by uttering certain words on a par-
ticular occasion, whereas expectation intentions are what they 
intend-or expect or hope-will be the consequences of uttering 
them.2 He therefore distinguishes between two kinds of origi-
nalism: "'semantic' originalism, which insists that the rights-
granting clauses be read to say what those who made them in-
tended to say, and 'expectation' originalism, which holds that 
these clauses should be understood to have the consequences 
that those who made them expected them to have."3 
Dworkin has always rejected expectation originalism. In-
deed, whenever he has criticized "ori~inalism" by name, he has 
clearly meant expectation originalism. Surprisingly, he now re-
jects non-originalism as well.5 It does not necessarily follow that 
he endorses semantic originalism, and he has recently reaffirmed 
his "long-standing opposition to any form of originalism. "6 But I 
* Professor of Law, Monash University, Australia. 
I. Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Fed-
eral Couns and the Law 115, 116, 119 (Princeton U. Press, 1997) ("Comment on Scalia"). 
Dworkin earlier expressed this distinction in terms of "linguistic" and "legal" intentions: 
Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the Constitution 291 (Harvard U. Press, 1996) 
("Freedom's Law"). 
2. Comment on Scalia at 116, 119 (cited in note 1). 
3. I d. at 119 (cited in note 1 ). 
4. Freedom's Law at 13, 291-92 (cited in note 1); Ronald Dworkin, Reflections on 
Fidelity, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1799, 1808 (1997) ("Reflections on Fidelity"). 
5. Sec text to notes 111 and 118-122 below. 
6. The Arduous Vinue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 Ford-
49 
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will argue that the differences between semantic originalism and 
the interpretive methodology he now recommends are so slight 
that he should be rega!ded as a semantic originalist-or, at the 
very least, as a "virtual" semantic originalist. It follows that his 
preferred methodology is similar to the one advocated by Rob-
ert Bork and Justice Antonin Scalia, prominent originalists 
whose views Dworkin has often criticized. It now seems that his 
quarrel is not so much with the methodology they advocate, but 
with their failure to apply it properly. His principal objection is 
that they preach semantic originalism, but practise expectation 
originalism.7 Moreover, the interpretive methodology he now 
advocates is very different from the one he recommended in 
1986, in Law's Empire, although (characteristically) he denies 
that it is. Given Dworkin's reputation as a leading critic of 
originalism, it is astonishing that this apparent change in his posi-
tion has not been more widely commented on. To document this 
change, it is necessary to describe in some detail the evolution of 
his views, illustrated with quotations from his writings. 
II. EARLY DWORKIN: PARTIAL ORIGINALISM 
Although I will argue that Dworkin's position has shifted 
since he wrote Law's Empire, elements of originalism can be 
found even in the writings that precede it. 
It is useful to begin with his early discussions of statutory in-
terpretation, which raise similar questions concerning the rele-
vance of the original intentions of legislators. Dworkin rarely 
discussed statutory interpretation before 1978, and had little to 
say when he did. For example, the essays reprinted in Taking 
Rights Seriously include very little analysis of it.8 In The Model 
of Rules I, first published in 1967, he showed that the courts of-
ten use general legal principles as "background standards" which 
justify statutory interpretations that depart from literal mean-
ings.9 But he did not discuss how this was justified. In particular, 
he did not attempt to explain how non-constitutional common 
law principles can be used in this way, given the doctrine of leg-
islative supremacy over the common law, otherwise than in ac-
ham L. Rev. 1249, 1258 n.18 (1997) (emphasis added) ("Arduous Vinue of Fidelity"). 
7. Freedom's Law, cbs. 12 and 14 and 350 n.10 (cited in note 1); Comment on 
Scalia at 119-27 (cited in note 1); Arduous Vinue of Fidelity at 1256-57 (cited in note 6). 
8. See, e.g., the skimpy remarks in Chapter 4, "Hard Cases," in Taking Rights Se-
riously 81, 105-10 (Duckworth Press, 19TI) (1975) ("Taking Rights Seriously"). 
9. Taking Rights Seriously at 28-29 and 23-24 more generally (cited in note 8). 
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cordance with some kind of legislative intention. He did not ad-
dress that question until Law's Empire. 
In Political Judges and the Rule of Law, first published in 
1978, he concluded that judges had to interpret unclear statutes 
in the light of their own judgments about moral rights, because 
historical evidence of legislators' intentions "will supply no use-
ful answers."10 But this conclusion was an overstatement, be-
cause the argument preceding it was that "except in very rare 
cases," such historical evidence will be insufficient to determine 
what meaning the legislators had in mind: "The rare exceptions 
are cases in which the legislative history contains some explicit 
statement that the statute being enacted had one rather than the 
other consequence, a statement made under circumstances such 
that those who voted for the statute must have shared that un-
derstanding. In most cases the legislative history contains noth-
ing so explicit."11 So he conceded that historical evidence could 
sometimes supply useful answers, and did not deny that in these 
"rare" cases, that evidence would be relevant, or perhaps even 
decisive. 
One year later, in How to Read the Civil Rights Act, 
Dworkin appeared to confirm that if there is sufficient evidence 
of legislators' intentions, it might be decisive. He distinguished 
two kinds of "legislative intention." The first, which he called 
"institutionalized intention," applies to a statement of policy or 
principle which, by virtue of settled conventions, is treated as "in 
some way enacted so that it becomes part of the legislation by 
express legislative decision." Examples include statements in-
cluded in preambles to statutes or in committee reports, or made 
by prominent spokesmen of bills and "accepted by other con-
gressmen as a kind of official clarification or informal amend-
ment." This idea of an institutionalised intention "is in no sense 
a psychological concept." Such a statement "is taken to be part 
of what is enacted, not because of any assumption about the 
hopes or motives or beliefs or other mental state of any particu-
lar congressman, but because the convention that attaches the 
statement to the statute is now part of the institution of legisla-
tion in the United States."12 
10. ·Chapter 1, "Political Judges and the Rule of Law," in A Maner of Principle 9, 
22-23 (Harvard U. Press,1985) (1978) ("Politicalludges"). 
II. Political Judges at 19 (cited in note 10). 
12. Chapter 16, "How to Read the Civil Rights Act," in A Matter of Principle 316, 
320-321 (cited in note 10) ("The Civil Rights Act"). 
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The second kind of legislative intention, which Dworkin 
called "collective understanding," is a "psychological concept": it 
"takes a legislative intention to be some combination ... of the 
beliefs of particular congressmen who draft, advocate, oppose, 
lobby for or against, and vote to pass or reject a particular stat-
ute," and it "supposes that some combination or function of 
these individual beliefs constitutes the collective understanding 
of the institution as a whole." Dworkin argued that this idea was 
"of limited use," because it was so difficult to satisfy the "mini-
mum requirement" imposed by democratic principle, namely, 
that the collective intention must have been shared by a majority 
of congressmen who voted for the statute, a majority sufficient 
to enact it by themselves if necessary.13 But he did not deny that, 
if in rare cases this requirement could be satisfied, the concept of 
collective intention would be relevant, and perhaps decisive. 
Dworkin went on in this article to recommend his own ap-
proach to statutory interpretation, based on the idea that "a 
statute should be interpreted to advance the policies or princi-
ples that furnish the best political justification for the statute."14 
But that approach includes a crucial element of originalism. It is 
not simply a matter of selecting a political justification that fits 
the words of the statute. "A proposed justification cannot be ac-
cepted, unless it is consistent with the provisions of the statute 
and finds substantial support in the political climate of the time 
[the statute was enacted]." If more than one justification is con-
sistent with the provisions of the statute, the second criterion 
might be decisive. It is therefore necessary to consider the ex-
tent to which each finds support in the speeches made by con-
gressmen at the time. "If the legislative history shows that while 
one justification had great support among a number of legisla-
tors, the other went unnoticed or was rejected by all who noticed 
it, then that might well be some evidence that the second does 
not, after all, reflect any widespread political opinion." Only if 
"both justifications ... fit well enough both the text of the stat-
ute and the political climate of the day" is the interpreter enti-
tled to prefer the one that the interpreter judges to be "superior 
as a matter of political morality."15 
There was also an originalist element in Dworkin's early 
writings on constitutional interpretation. He has always argued 
13. ld. at 321-22. 
14. ld. at 327. 
15. I d. at 328-29 (emphasis added). 
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that the most controversial rights-bearing clauses of the Consti-
tution are best interpreted as enacting abstract principles of po-
litical morality, rather than concrete beliefs about the proper ap-
plication of those principles. The originalist element in this 
argument is the suggestion that at least part of the case for it is 
that it is faithful to the "abstract intentions" of the framers. 16 
In Constitutional Cases, originally published in 1972, he 
drew a distinction between general moral concepts-for exam-
ple, justice or equality-and specific conceptions of what those 
concepts require in particular cases. He argued that so-called 
"vague" constitutional clauses require the Supreme Court to ap-
ply general moral concepts, rather than the framers' specific 
conceptions of what those concepts require in particular cases. 
In deciding whether or not the death penalty violates the prohi-
bition of "cruel and unusual punishment," for example, the 
Court must make its own moral judgment about the cruelty of 
capital punishment, regardless of the framers' beliefs on the 
subject. But Dworkin acknowledged that those beliefs "would 
be decisive if the framers of the clause had meant to lay down a 
particular conception of cruelty." The point is that the framers 
had not done so. "If those who enacted the broad clauses had 
meant to lay down particular conceptions, they would have 
found the sort of language conventionally used to do this. "17 
"The 'vague' standards were chosen deliberately, by the men 
who drafted and adopted them, in place of the more specific and 
limited rules that they might have enacted. "18 Therefore, the 
question was: "Can the Court, responding to the framers' appeal 
to the concept of cruelty, now defend a conception that does not 
make death cruel?" 
Dworkin rejected the non-originalist thesis that the meaning 
of the Constitution evolves over time. He said that defenders of 
the Court who overlooked the distinction between concepts and 
conceptions were forced to make the "vulnerable" argument 
"that ideas of cruelty change over time, and that the Court must 
be free to reject out-of-date conceptions; this suggests that the 
Court must change what the Constitution enacted." In reality, 
by complying with its duty to enforce general concepts rather 
than conceptions, the Court was merely enforcing, and not 
16. See, e.g., Chapter 2, "The Forum of Principle," in Dworkin, A Matter of Princi-
ple 33, 53-57 (cited in note I 0) ("The Forum of Principle"). 
17. Chapter 5, "Constitutional Cases," in Taking Rights Seriously 131, 135-36 (cited 
in note 8) ("Constitutional Cases"). 
18. Id. at 133. 
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changing, "what the Constitution says."19 As he put the point 
later, "[i]f the abstract statement is chosen as the appropriate 
mode or level of investigation into the original intention, then 
judges must make substantive decisions of political morality not 
in place of judgments made by the 'Framers' but rather in serv-
ice of those judgments."20 
In The Forum of Principle, first published in 1981, Dworkin 
said that "almost any constitutional theory relies on some con-
ception of an original intention or understanding. 'Noninterpre-
tive' theories [such as his] are those that emphasize an especially 
abstract statement of original intentions ... The important ques-
tion for constitutional theory is not whether the intention of 
those who made the Constitution should count, but rather what 
should count as that intention."21 That question, or some aspects 
of it, could in principle be settled by convention, as in the case of 
the conventions that govern the enactment of statutes, which 
designate certain kinds of statements of legislative intention as 
part of what is enacted. But "there is plainly no equally elabo-
rated convention about constitutional intention . . . constitu-
tional practice in itself neither automatically excludes nor in-
cludes, as legislative practice does, matters that an historian 
might regard as pertinent to establishing the intention of those 
who made the Constitution. "22 All that had been established was 
agreement at a very general level about the relevance of original 
intentions. Here, Dworkin relied upon the distinction between 
concepts and conceptions that he had drawn earlier. He said 
that there was general agreement about the concept of a consti-
tutional intention, but disagreement among proponents of dif-
ferent conceptions of it. 
We share the assumptions that when controversy breaks out 
[about the equal protection clause] ... it is relevant to ask 
about the purposes or beliefs that were in some sense "in the 
mind" of some group of people who were in some manner 
connected with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
because these beliefs and purposes should be influential in 
some way in deciding what force the equal protection clause 
now has. We agree on that general proposition, and this 
agreement gives us what we might call the concept of a consti-
tutional intention. But we disagree about how the blanks in 
19. Id. at 136. 
20. The Forum of Principle at 49 (cited in note 16). 
21. ld. at 57; see also id. at 35, 39. 
22. Id. at 42. 
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the proposition should be filled in. . . . Different conceptions 
of constitutional intention give different answers to these 
• 23 questwns. 
55 
Dworkin insisted that the choice between these different 
conceptions of constitutional intention had to turn on considera-
tions of political morality, not historical, psychological, or con-
ceptual analysis, although he added that the choice was 
"bounded by those aspects of the concept of intention that are 
not contested, as I suggested in my description of the common 
assumptions that provide us with the concept. "24 This was true of 
the choice that had to be made between applying the framers' 
abstract intentions and applying their concrete ones, which was 
"[t]he most important choice, in constructing a conception of 
constitutional intention." Even if the framers themselves had an 
"interpretation intention" about that very choice (for example, 
that their abstract intentions should be applied, but not their 
concrete ones) it would be irrelevant: "the question of which of 
their intentions should count cannot itself be referred to their in-
tentions." The choice had to turn on considerations of political 
morality.25 Here, Dworkin seems to have retreated from the po-
sition he took in Constitutional Cases. There, he argued that the 
choice between abstract and concrete intentions depended on 
which of the two the framers had "meant to lay down." But in 
The Forum of Principle he said that the choice between them 
cannot itself be determined by the intentions of the framers, but 
only by considerations of political morality.26 Recently, as we 
will see, he seems to have returned to the earlier position: if the 
framers "meant to lay down" an abstract concept rather than 
their own concrete applications of that concept, then that was 
their semantic intention, which he now says is decisive; whereas 
their "concrete" intentions were merely expectation intentions, 
and are therefore irrelevant.27 But even the position he took in 
The Forum of Principle is not inconsistent with originalism: no 
intelligent originalist would argue that intentions of the framers 
are binding simply because the framers intended them to be. As 
Dworkin rightly objected, that would obviously beg the ques-
23. Id. at 39. 
24. Id. at 39-40; see also id. at 55-56. 
25. ld. at 55. 
26. But Dworkin denies that there has been any retreat, by making the dubious 
claim that his earlier argument in Constitutional Cases was an "ad hominem" one, di-
rected "against the view that 'strict' construction of the Constitution provided maximum 
deference to the wishes of the Framers." The Forum of Principle at 53 (cited in note 16). 
27. This is made clear in id. at 48. 
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tion.28 All normative interpretive theories must be, and all im-
portant originalist theories are, ultimately grounded in consid-
erations of political morality. 
III. MIDDLE DWORKIN: THE NON-ORIGINALISM 
OF LAW'S EMPIRE 
Law's Empire is much more hostile to originalist ideas than 
Dworkin's earlier, and later, writings. In it, he distinguished 
what he called "conversational" interpretation from "construc-
tive" interpretation. Conversational interpretation "assigns 
meaning in the light of the motives and purposes and concerns it 
supposes the speaker to have, and it reports its conclusions as 
statements about his 'intentions' in saying what he did." 29 
Dworkin rejected the idea that this kind of interpretation was 
appropriate in the case of statutes. He rejected the "speaker's 
meaning" theory, which 
supposes, in short, that proper interpretation of a statute must 
be ... conversational rather than constructive interpretation. 
The ruling model of this theory is the familiar model of ordi-
nary speech. When a friend says something, we may ask, 
"What did he mean by that?" and think that our answer to 
that question describes something about his state of mind 
when he spoke, some idea he meant to communicate to us in 
speaking as he did. . . . If someone accepts the speaker's 
meaning view ... [h]e will present his conclusions as state-
ments about the intention of the statute itself .... But he re-
gards the intention of the statute as a theoretical construction, 
a compendious statement of the discrete intentions of par-
ticular actual people, because only these can actually have 
conversational intentions of the sort he has in mind.30 
Dworkin argued that any attempt to apply the speaker's 
meaning theory to statutes would be confounded by a "catalogue 
of mysteries," including the identity of "the speaker," the time of 
his speaking, and the mental state that supplied his meaning. 
The "root" of these difficulties is "the idea ... that legislation is 
an act of communication to be understood on the simple model 
of speaker and audience, so that the commanding question in 
28. ld. at 54. 
29. Law's Empire 50 (Harvard U. Press, 1986) ("Law's Empire"). 
30. Id at 315. 
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legislative interpretation is what a particular speaker or group 
'meant' in some canonical act of utterance."31 
The law in general, including statutes, should be interpreted 
constructively, not conversationally. Constructive interpreta-
tion, of art or social practices, for example, is also "essentially 
concerned with purpose not cause. But the purposes in play are 
not (fundamentally) those of some author but of the interpreter. 
Roughly, constructive interpretation is a matter of imposing 
purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it the best 
possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to be-
long."32 The law should therefore be interpreted so as to make it 
"the best that it can be." It follows from this that any interpreta-
tion of the law must give due weight to the principle of integrity, 
which requires the state or community to act on a single, coher-
ent set of principles.33 Applied to adjudication, this requires 
judges to "identify legal rights and duties, so far as possible, on 
the assumption that they were all created by a single author-the 
community personified-expressing a coherent conception of 
justice and fairness. "34 
Constructive interpretation, as Dworkin described it, is in-
hospitable to originalism for three main reasons. The first is that 
attributing a conception of justice and fairness to "the commu-
nity personified" does not depend on any one or number of per-
sons' actual intentions or mental states.35 
[W]hen I speak of the community being faithful to its own 
principles I do not mean its conventional or popular morality, 
the beliefs and convictions of most citizens .... I mean only to 
endorse a complex, two-stage way of reasoning about the re-
sponsibilities of officials and citizens that finds a natural ex-
pression in the personification of community and cannot be 
reproduced by a reductive translation into claims about offi-
cials and citizens one by one.36 
Dworkin wished to take advantage of a well-accepted prac-
tice or way of thinking in which we attribute actions, purposes, 
faults and responsibilities to corporations and governmental in-
stitutions-including the state itself. This involves personifying 
31. Id. at 348. 
32. Id. at 52. 
33. ld. at 166. 
34. ld. at 225. 
35. ld. at 335-36. 
36. Id. at 168-69. 
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such bodies, "supposing" or "assuming" that they "can be com-
mitted to principles ... in some way analogous to the way par-
ticular people can be," and "applying facsimiles of our principles 
about individual fault and responsibility to [them]."37 "But it is 
still a personification not a discovery, because we recognize that 
the community has no independent metaphysical existence, that 
it is itself a creature of the practices of thought and language in 
which it figures. "38 It is a matter of treating the political commu-
nity "as if .. . [it] really were some special kind of entity distinct 
from the actual people who are its citizens. "39 
So constructive interpretation of the community's concep-
tion of justice and fairness is not concerned with the mental 
states of individuals. But it does not follow that it has no use for 
the concepts of purpose and intention. To the contrary, it must 
accommodate actual judicial practice, such as the way in which 
judges "constantly refer to the various statements congressmen 
and other legislators make, in committee reports or formal de-
bates, about the purpose of an act. "40 Dworkin claimed that his 
interpretive methods "provide a better interpretation of actual 
judicial practice than the speaker's meaning theory."41 "The doc-
trine celebrated in judicial rhetoric-that statutes must be en-
forced looking to the intentions behind them-now shows its 
true colors. It is only the principle of adjudicative integrity ... 
cast as a motto for judges reading statutes."42 "[T]he idea of a 
statute's purpose or intention" is best understood "not as some 
combination of the purposes or intentions of particular legisla-
tors, but as the upshot of integrity, of taking the interpretive atti-
tude toward the political events that include the statute's enact-
ment."43 
Constructive interpretation aims at identifying a coherent 
set of principles that best explains and justifies all the decisions 
that have been taken in the name of the community. The second 
37. Id. at 167,170. 
38. ld. at 171. 
39. ld. at 168 (emphasis added). This enables us to derive judgments about how 
individual officials or agents of the community should act. Indeed, that is the point of 
this way of thinking: "we are [not) interested in group responsibility for its own sake. 
There would be no point to developing or applying principles of group responsibility if 
we did not assume that these were connected to judgments about how real people must 
now act." Id. at 171. 
40. Id. at 314. 
41. ld. at 316. 
42. Id. at 337. 
43. ld. at 316. 
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reason why constructive interpretation is inhospitable to origi-
nalism follows from this: a statute should not be interpreted in 
isolation from the rest of the law. Integrity requires the judge 
"to construct, for each statute he is asked to enforce, some justi-
fication that fits and flows through that statute and is, if possible, 
consistent with other legislation in force."44 Of course, "the law is 
far from perfectly consistent in principle overall. ... (L)egislative 
supremacy gives force to some statutes that are inconsistent in 
principle with others."45 "If a judge is satisfied that a statute ad-
mits of only one interpretation, then, barring constitutional im-
pediment, he must enforce this as law even if he thinks the stat-
ute inconsistent in principle with the law more broadly seen. "46 
But consistency is nevertheless an important goal: the judge 
should prefer an interpretation that makes the statute consistent 
in principle with the rest of the law. And as Dworkin acknowl-
edges, an interpretation of one statute, required to fit it alone, is 
likely to differ from an interpretation that must embrace other 
statutes as well, made at different times by legislators with dif-
ferent political convictions.47 
The third, and most important, reason why constructive in-
terpretation is inhospitable to originalism is that the former is 
concerned with the community's present, rather than its past, 
commitments: the conception of justice and fairness that the 
community can plausibly be regarded as currently committed to, 
by virtue of its standing legal rules and practices.48 Conversa-
tional interpretation, concerned with speaker's meaning, sup-
poses that there is "a particular moment of history ... at which 
the statute's meaning is fixed once and for all," a "canonical 
moment at which a statute is born and has all and only the 
meaning it will ever have. "49 "The speaker's meaning theory 
stares at convictions present and expressed when a statute was 
passed and ignores later changes. Only 'original' intentions can 
be pertinent to discovering a statute's meaning at its birth; an 
appeal to changed opinion must be an anachronism, a logically 
absurd excuse for judicial amendment."50 But constructive in-
terpretation follows a very different path. 
44. Id. at338 (emphasis added). 
45. ld. at 268. 
46. ld. at 401. 
47. Id. at349-50. 
48. Id. at 225. 
49. Id. at 348. 
50. Id. at 349. 
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Law as integrity ... begins in the present and pursues the past 
only so far as and in the way its contemporary focus dictates. 
It does not aim to recapture, even for present law, the ideals 
and practical purposes of the politicians who first created it. 
It aims rather to justify what they did (sometimes including, as 
we shall see, what they said) in an overall story worth telling 
now, a story with a complex claim: that present practice can 
be organized by and justified in principles sufficiently attrac-
tive to provide an honorable future .... When a judge de-
clares that a particular principle is instinct in law, he reports 
not a simple-minded claim about the motives of past states-
men, a claim a wise cynic can easily refute, but an interpretive 
proposal: that the principle both fits and justifies some com-
plex part of legal practice, that it provides an attractive way to 
see, in the structure of that practice, the consistency of princi-
ple integrity requires. 51 
[The ideal judge] tries to impose order over doctrine, not to 
discover order in the forces that created it. He struggles to-
ward a set of principles he can offer to integrity, a scheme for 
transforming the varied links in the chain of law into a vision 
of government now speaking with one voi~. even if this is 
very different from the voices of leaders past. ' 2 
This is very reminiscent of non-originalism in constitutional 
theory. Non-originalists often say that a constitution should be 
interpreted as if it expresses the values or will of the contempo-
rary community, rather than those of the founding generation. 
In Law's Empire, Dworkin recommended that approach to the 
interpretation of law as a whole, including the constitution. The 
law is to be interpreted as if, as a whole, it expresses a coherent 
conception of justice and fairness to which the contemporary 
community is committed. 
Moreover, interpreters should try to find in such a concep-
tion "the best constructive interpretation of the political struc-
ture and legal doctrine of their community. They try to make 
that complex structure and record the best these can be. "53 So if 
more than one conception fits that structure and record, inter-
preters must ask "which shows the community's structure of in-
stitutions and decisions-its public standards as a whole-in a 
better light from the standpoint of political morality. "54 
51. ld. at227-28. 
52. Id. at 273. 
53. Id. at 255. 
54. Id. at 256. 
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Turning to statutory interpretation in particular, Dworkin's 
recommended approach was as follows: 
Integrity requires [the judge] to construct, for each statute he 
is asked to enforce, some justification that fits and flows 
through that statute and is, if possible, consistent with other 
legislation in force. This means he must ask himself which 
combination of which principles and policies, with which as-
signments of relative importance when these compete, pro-
vides the best case for what the plain words of the statute 
plainly require. 55 
We noticed that in an earlier article, Dworkin argued that it 
is not simply a matter of selecting a political justification that fits 
the words of the statute; the interpretation must also find sub-
stantial support in "the political climate of the time [the statute 
was enacted]."56 But in Law's Empire, Dworkin modified this 
originalist constraint. He there acknowledged two reasons why 
judges might properly be influenced by the concrete convictions 
expressed by the legislators who enacted a statute. First, judges 
must take into account the principle of fairness, which requires 
that questions of policy be settled by the will of the people. In-
sofar as the statute was motivated by policy, rather than princi-
ple, its interpretation should therefore be guided by "evidence of 
public opinion across the community as a whole." For that rea-
son, judges should consult "the expressed concrete convictions 
of the various legislators who spoke in the debates, drafted 
committee reports, and so forth." If the debates over a statute 
expressed a widespread and uncontradicted preference for one 
policy rather than another, that would be strong evidence of 
general public opinion.57 (But note that this is inapplicable to 
statutes, or parts of statutes, that are best interpreted as giving 
effect to principles rather than policies.) 
Secondly, certain legislative statements of policy and princi-
ple-such as committee reports, and statements made by con-
gressional sponsors of legislation-enjoy a special status, being 
treated in practice "as part of what the legislative process has ac-
tually produced, something to which the community as a whole 
is thereby committed." They are "themselves acts of the state 
personified. They are themselves political decisions, so the chief 
command of integrity, that the state act in a principled way, em-
55. Id. at 338 (footnote omitted). 
56. The Civil Rights Act at328-29 (cited in note 12), discussed in pp. 52-53. 
57. Law's Empire at 341 (cited in note 29). 
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braces them as well as the more discrete decisions captured in 
statutes." The state would not act with integrity if it said one 
thing while doing another. Judges must therefore seek a coher-
ent conception of justice and fairness that is consistent with 
both.58 
In the same earlier article, Dworkin said that such a state-
ment is "in some way enacted so that it becomes part of the leg-
islation by express legislative decision."59 But in Law's Empire, 
he insisted that judges have good reasons "both for counting the 
formal statements that make up legislative history as acts of the 
state and for not treating them as part of the statute itself." The 
statute itself is a performative legislative act, whereas the formal 
statements that accompanied it are merely interpretive explana-
tions of that act. "Legislative history offers a contemporary in-
terpretation of the statute it surrounds, an interpretation that 
may later be revised by courts or the legislature itself."60 That 
history provides "reports of public purpose and conviction," 
which are "vulnerable to reassessment. "61 
Both these reasons for interpreting a statute consistently 
with the legislative history accompanying its enactment-which 
derive from the principles of fairness, and of integrity-grow 
weaker with the passage of time. The primary aim of the inter-
preter is to identify a set of principles and policies that justifies, 
not the original enactment of the statute, but its current place 
within the law as a whole. The object is to identify a coherent 
conception of justice and fairness that best explains and justifies 
the contemporary community's commitment to its laws, includ-
ing that statute. 
Hercules [Dworkin's ideal judge] interprets not just the stat-
ute's text but its life, the process that begins before it becomes 
law and extends far beyond that moment. He aims to make 
the best he can of this continuing story, and his interpretation 
therefore changes as the story develops. He does not identify 
particular people as the exclusive "framers" of a statute and 
then. at.tend only to their hopes ?r e~pectations or concrete 
conv1ctwns or statements or reactwns. 
58. ld. at 342-43 (footnote omitted). 
59. The Civil Rights Act at 320-21 (cited in note 12). 
60. Law's Empire at 346 (cited in note 29). 
61. ld. at 350. 
62. ld. at 348. 
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If a statute was enacted in a climate of opinion very different 
from that in which it must later be interpreted, Hercules must be 
guided by the latter rather than the former. 
He asks which interpretation provides the best account of a 
political history that now includes not only the act but the 
failure to repeal or amend it later, and he will therefore look 
not to public opinion at the beginning ... but now .... The ar-
gument from fairness will have a very different impact than it 
would have if the case had come before him much earlier.63 
The passage of time also diminishes the impact of the principle 
of integrity. "Hercules will pay less and less attention to the 
original legislative history." Formal statements of the statute's 
purpose, made when it was enacted, are of decreasing relevance 
as time passes, because 
they will have been supplemented and perhaps replaced, as 
formal interpretations of public commitment, by a variety of 
other interpretive explanations attached to later statutes on 
related issues. These later statements provide a more con-
temporary account of how the community's officials under-
stand its standing commitments of principle and operating 
strategies of policy.64 
But Hercules does not covertly amend old statutes to suit new 
times. "He recognizes what the old statutes have since be-
come."65 
Dworkin also rejected the speaker's meaning theory of the 
Constitution, for much the same reasons as in the case of stat-
utes.66 His criticisms of that theory were aimed mainly at dem-
onstrating the irrelevance of the framers' "concrete" intentions, 
concerning the application to particular issues of the abstract 
language of clauses such as the Fourteenth Amendment. But he 
also appeared to deny the relevance of the framers' "abstract" 
intentions. He argued that a "historicist," who "limits eligible 
interpretations of the Constitution to principles that express the 
historical intentions of the framers," should concede that the 
framers' "dominant conviction was abstract" and should prevail 
over any inconsistent concrete intention.67 But his own interpre-
tive methodology, based on the principle of "integrity," did not 
63. ld. at 349. 
64. Id. at 350. 
65. ld. 
66. ld. at 361. 
67. Id. at 360, 362. 
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depend on that historical argument. The Constitution must be 
interpreted as an expression of the best coherent vision of justice 
that can plausibly be attributed to the contemporary community. 
The relevance of public declarations of intention or purpose 
made by the framers therefore diminishes as time passes. In-
deed, the case in favor of taking them into account "could not be 
weaker" than it is in the constitutional context. They "were 
made not just in different political circumstances but to and for 
an entirely different form of political life. It would be silly to 
take the opinions of those who first voted on the Fourteenth 
Amendment as reporting the public morality of the United 
States a century later . . . . [I]t would deny that community the 
power to change its public sense ofpurpose."68 What the framers 
may have believed "cannot be evidence of any deep and domi-
nant contemporary opinion .... The old legislative history is no 
longer an act of the nation personified declaring some contem-
porary public purpose. "69 
This can result in changes to constitutional law even at rela-
tively abstract levels. For example, Dworkin compared different 
abstract theories of unconstitutional state-sponsored discrimina-
tion.70 He said that the narrowest and earliest "[p]erhaps ... 
would have been adequate under tests of fairness and fit at some 
time in our history; perhaps it would have been adequate when 
Plessy was decided. It is not adequate now, nor was it in 
1954 .... The American people would almost unanimously have 
rejected it, even in 1954, as not faithful to their convictions about 
racial justice. "71 
IV. LATE DWORKIN: SEMANTIC ORIGINALISM 
The most striking difference between Dworkin's latest dis-
cussions of statutory and constitutional interpretation, and those 
in Law's Empire, is his current reliance on a distinction, which 
he says is "crucial," between "semantic" intentions, and "expec-
tation" intentions. Recall that semantic intentions are what 
people intend to say by uttering certain words on a particular oc-
casion, while expectation intentions are what they intend-or 
68. ld. at 365. 
69. ld. at 388. 
70. Dworkin himself describes different "conception[s] of treating people as 
equals" as a matter of "abstract convictions." Id. at 363. 
71. ld. at 387. 
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expect or hope-will be the consequence of uttering them.72 
These two kinds of intentions differ because people may hold er-
roneous beliefs about the proper application, or denotation, of 
what they say. Legislators, for example, may make a law that 
they know means x, believing that x does not denote y, whereas 
in fact x does denote y. If the meaning of that law depends on 
their semantic intention but not their expectation intention, it 
should be held to apply to y notwithstanding their belief that it 
should not be. 
Sometimes Dworkin defines "originalism" as the theory 
that the meaning of the Constitution depends on the framers' 
expectation intentions, rather than (or as well as) on their se-
mantic intentions.73 But elsewhere he distinguishes between two 
kinds of originalism: '"semantic' originalism, which insists that 
the rights-granting clauses be read to say what those who made 
them intended to say, and 'expectation' originalism, which holds 
that these clauses should be understood to have the conse-
quences that those who made them expected them to have."74 
Since he now says that "the Constitution means what the framers 
intended to say,"75 he himself seems to be a semantic originalist. 
Moreover, he seems to have radically changed his views since 
Law's Empire, in which he continually criticized "the speaker's 
meaning theory," which holds "that [judges] must apply statutes 
by discovering the communicative will of the legislators, what 
they were trying to say when they voted for (the statute)."76 He 
now seems to endorse a version of the speaker's meaning theory 
of the Constitution. 
In Law's Empire, Dworkin rejected the idea of using ordi-
nary speech ("conversation") as a model for statutory or consti-
tutional interpretation.n But in his most recent writings, 
Dworkin continually uses "the familiar model of ordinary 
speech" to explain statutory and constitutional meaning. He 
frequently uses examples of ordinary speech to illuminate statu-
tory meaning.78 "(J]ust as our judgment about what friends and 
strangers say relies on specific information about them and the 
72. Comment on Scalia atll6, 119 (cited in note 1). 
73. See, e.g., Freedom's LAw at 13,291-92 (cited in note 1). 
74. Comment on Scalia at119 (cited in note 1). 
75. Freedom's LAw at 13 (cited in note 1 ). 
76. LAw's Empire at317 (cited in note 29). 
77. See pp. 56-57. 
78. See, e.g., Comment on Scalia at 116-17 (cited in note 1); Arduous Virtue of Fi-
delity at1255-56 (cited in note 6); Freedom's LAw at292-93 (cited in note 1). 
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context in which they speak," he says, "so does our understand-
ing of what the framers said."79 
Any reader of anything must attend to semantic intention, be-
cause the same sounds or even words can be used with the in-
tention of saying different things. If I tell you ... that I ad-
mire bays, you would have to decide whether I intended to 
say that I admire certain horses or certain bodies of water. 
Until you had, you would have no idea what I had actually 
said even though you would know what sounds I had ut-
tered .... We do not know what Congress actually said [in a 
statute] ... until we have answered the question of what it is 
reasonable to suppose, in all the circumstances includin~ the 
rest of the statute, it intended to say in speaking as it did. 
"[A] text is not just a series of letters and spaces: It consists of 
propositions," and "[w]e decide what propositions a text con-
tains by assigning semantic intentions to those who made the 
text."81 This applies as well to the Constitution. Dworkin says 
that his own "moral reading" of the Constitution "insists that the 
Constitution means what the framers intended to say."82 "[W]e 
must look to the authors' semantic intentions to discover what 
the clauses of the Constitution mean .... [T]he semantic inten-
tions of historical statesmen inevitably fix what the document 
they made says. "83 
We must try to find language of our own that best captures, in 
terms we find clear, the content of what the "framers" in-
tended it to say .... History is crucial to that project, because 
we must know something about the circumstances in which a 
person spoke to have any good idea of what he meant to say 
in speaking as he did. 84 
[Just] as our judgment about what friends and strangers say 
relies on specific information about them and the context in 
which they speak, so does our understanding of what the 
framers said. History is therefore plainly relevant. But only 
in a particular way. We tum to history to answer the question 
of what they intended to say, not the different question of 
what other intentions they had. We have no need to decide 
what they expected to happen, or hoped would happen, in 
79. Freedom's Law at 10 (cited in note 1). 
80. Comment on Scalia at 117 (cited in note 1). 
81. Arduous Virtue of Fidelity at 1260 (cited in note 6). 
82 Freedom's Law at 13 (cited in note 1). 
83. Arduous Virtue of Fidelity at 1255 (cited in note 6). 
84. Freedom's Law at 8 (cited in note 1). 
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consequence of their having said what they did, for exam-
ple .... ss 
67 
The difference between Dworkin's approach in Law's Em-
pire and his approach in more recent writings is not confined to 
theoretical generalizations. Frederick Schauer argues that, for 
all Dworkin's recent talk about "semantic intentions," his argu-
ment that certain constitutional provisions enact abstract princi-
ples "is driven by the language of the document, and not by ex-
amination of the extrinsic evidence of what was on the Framers' 
minds .... Thus, for Dworkin it appears that the presence of the 
abstract language of moral principle within the text is both a 
necessary and a sufficient condition for a moral reading of any 
clause containing such language. "86 If this were true of 
Dworkin's methodology in general, his theoretical appeal to 
"semantic intentions" would be mere window-dressing: the 
framers would automatically be deemed to have intended to say 
whatever the words they used mean, according to their conven-
tional dictionary meanings.87 But Schauer is wrong. Dworkin in-
sists in reply that in deciding what law-makers intended to say, 
an interpreter is not confined to the "acontextual meaning of the 
language they used."88 Moreover, he approves of an example, 
supplied by Michael McConnell, of a constitutional provision in 
which the framers appear to have used general language to enact 
a rule much more limited than its acontextual meaning would 
suggest. The "ex post facto" clause in Article I, section 9, states 
that "no ... ex post facto law shall be passed." According to 
McConnell, the framers were persuaded, after they had adopted 
those words, that in law-as distinct from everyday usage-the 
words "ex post facto law" were restricted to criminal laws, which 
led them to insert a separate clause prohibiting the retrospective 
impairment of contractual obligations.89 Dworkin agrees that, 
based on what McConnell says, it is much more plausible to in-
terpret the words in a restricted, rather than an unrestricted, 
way, and that this "illustrates, therefore, the pertinence of his-
85. Freedom's LAw at 10 (cited in note 1). 
86. Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Invocations, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1295, 1300-
01 (1997) (footnote omitted) 
87. ld. at 1300 n.22. 
88. Reflections on Fidelity at 1815 (cited in note 4). 
89. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A 
Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 Fordham L. 
Rev. 1269, 1280 n.54 (1997). 
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tory to the construction of semantic as well as expectation inten-
tion. "00 
Dworkin says that if we learnt that in the eighteenth century 
the word "cruel" was used to mean expensive, we would have to 
read the Eighth Amendment as saying that expensive and un-
usual punishments, rather than cruel and unusual ones, are for-
bidden.91 He sometimes relies on evidence of "what the framers 
presumably intended to say when they used the words they did." 
He rejects one possible interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, for example, partly on the ground that 
"[c]ongressmen of the victorious nation, trying to capture the 
achievements and lessons of a terrible war, would be very un-
likely to settle for anything so limited and insipid ..... "92 
Another example that shows how much Dworkin's ap-
proach has changed since Law's Empire is the very different jus-
tification of the decision in Riggs v. Palmer93 that he now favors. 
In that case, a New York court held that a man who had mur-
dered his grandfather was not entitled to inherit the bulk of his 
victim's estate, despite the fact that his victim's last will-which 
complied with all the express requirements of the applicable 
statute of wills-named him as the heir. The statute said nothing 
one way or the other about the right of a murderer to inherit un-
der his victim's will. The court relied partly on the legislature's 
unexpressed intention, citing the canon of construction that "a 
thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the 
statute, unless it be within the intention of the makers." The 
court also relied partly on the principle that, as Dworkin puts it, 
a statute should be construed "so as to make it conform as 
closely as possible to principles of justice assumed elsewhere in 
the law," including the principle that no-one should be permitted 
to profit from his own wrong-doing.94 
In Law's Empire, Dworkin rejected the first, and endorsed 
the second, of these two reasons for the court's decision. In do-
ing so, he once again dismissed the relevance of the speaker's 
90. Reflections on Fidelity at 1806 (cited in note 4). 
91. Freedom's Law at 291 (cited in note 1). Of course, judicial interpretation of the 
clause might not be affected by this discovery, because according to Dworkin's theory of 
Jaw as "integrity," judicial decisions must be consistent with past decisions and political 
practice, as well as with what the Constitution says. See also Arduous Vinue of Fidelity 
at 1252 (cited in note 6) (discussing the meaning of the word 'gay' in Milton's Paradise 
Lost). 
92. Freedom's Law at 9 (cited in note 1). 
93. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). 
94. Law's Empire at 18-20 (cited in note 29) (footnote omitted). 
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meaning theory to statutory interpretation. "Is the statute of 
wills unclear on the question whether murderers may inherit?" 
[W]e cannot locate the unclarity of the text in the ambiguity 
or vagueness or abstraction of any particular word or 
phrase .... If we find it [unclear], this can only be because we 
ourselves have some reason to think that murderers should 
not inherit. ... If we followed the speaker's meaning theory 
we would be tempted to say: because we have reason to think 
that those who adopted the statute did not intend murderers 
to inherit. But we can make sense of that claim only counter-
factually, and then we see that it is too strong. Does it be-
come unclear whether Nazis may inherit if we think the origi-
nal authors of the statute would not have wanted Nazis to 
inherit if they had anticipated them? It is only because we 
think the case for excluding murderers from a general statute 
of wills is a strong one, sanctioned by principles elsewhere re-
spected in the law, that we find the statute unclear on the is-
95 
sue. 
But now, Dworkin offers this justification for the decision: 
I continue to think that the majority reached the right deci-
sion, in Riggs v. Palmer, in holding that, according to the bet-
ter interpretive reconstruction, those who created the Statute 
of Wills did not intend to say something that allowed a mur-
derer to inherit from his victim .... It is a perfectly familiar 
speech practice not to include, even in quite specific instruc-
tions, all the qualifications one would accept or insist on: all 
the ~alifications, as one might put it, that "go without say-
ing." 
He adds that this justification of Riggs and similar cases is based 
on "a convincing explanation for the speech acts in question."97 
But explaining a speech act in terms of the speaker's intentions 
is what the speaker's meaning theory is all about! 
On the other hand, with Dworkin, as we have learned so of-
ten in the past, exegesis is rarely straight-forward. One must 
carefully search the "fine print" for subtle qualifications. While 
insisting that the meaning of constitutional provisions depends 
on the semantic intentions of the framers, Dworkin has reaf-
95. ld. at 351-52. 
96. Reflections on Fidelity at 1816 (cited in note 4) (footnote omitted). This is iden-
tical to my own explanation of the case: sec Implications in Language, Law and the Con-
stitution in Geoffrey Lindell, ed., Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law 150, 
166 (Federation Press, 1994). 
97. Reflections on Fidelity at 1816 (cited in note 4). 
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firmed both his "long-standing opposition to any form of origi-
nalism ... [and] the account of statutory and constitutional in-
terpretation that I argued at length in Chapters 9 and 10 of 
Law's Empire."98 How can this possibly be so? Two possible 
reasons come to mind. 
One reason why Dworkin might still think that he is not an 
originalist of any kind is that he reiterates his denial, in Law's 
Empire, that statutory or constitutional interpretation should be 
governed by the actual mental states-thoughts that really were 
in the minds-of individual legislators. Consider the following 
scattered remarks, recently offered in explanation of his strategy: 
When we are trying to decide what someone meant to 
say ... we are deciding which clarifying translation of his in-
scriptions is the best. It is a matter of complex and subtle 
philosophical argument what such translations consist in .... 
The difficulties are greatly increased when we are translating 
not the utterances of a real person, but those of an institution 
like a legislature. We rely on personification-we suppose 
that the institution has semantic intentions of its own-and it 
is difficult to understand what sense that makes, or what spe-
cial standards we should use to discover or construct such in-
tentions. Scalia would not agree with my own opinions about 
these matters. [Here Dworkin drops a footnote to "chapter 9 
of my Law's Empire".t 
The idea of an institutional intention is deeply ambigu-
ous ... and political judgment is required to decide which of 
the different meanings it might have is appropriate to consti-
tutional interpretation. (See my book, Law's Empire. . . , 
chap.9.)100 
We must begin, in my view, by asking what-on the best 
evidence available-the authors of the text in question in-
tended to say. This is an exercise in what I have called con-
structive interpretation. [Another footnote to Law's Empire, 
ch.9] It does not mean peeking inside the skulls of people 
dead for centuries. It means trying to make the best sense we 
can of an historical event-someone, or a social group with 
particular responsibilities, speaking or writing in a particular 
way on a particular occasion .... [W]e are trying to make the 
best sense of the Framers speaking as they did in the context 
98. Arduous Virtue of Fidelity at 1258 n.l8 (cited in note 6) (emphasis added). 
99. Comment on Scalia at 117-18 (cited in note 1). 
100. Freedom's Law at 380 (cited in note 1). 
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0 h" h h k 101 m w 1c t ey spo e .... 
[T)he question of what we should take a body of statesmen 
or politicians to have said, in endorsing some particular lan-
guage on some particular occasion, is not answered by hy-
potheses about individual mental states, but rather by an at-
tempt to make the best sense, as a political act, of their 
102 
endorsement of that language. 
I [do not) think that the people who together enacted a par-
ticular constitutional amendment shared a particular, identifi-
able phenomenological state . . . . [T)hough interpretive 
claims about a group's semantic intention are properly re-
ported in the language of intention, and though they draw on 
suppositions about beliefs and attitudes, they are not them-
selves phenomenological hypotheses. They are, as I have re-
peatedly said, constructions aimed at making best sense of a 
collective act of statesmanship that includes speech acts .... 
The pertinent question is therefore not ... whether we can 
fish mental states from history and subject them to a merely 
"empirical" examination. 103 
71 
Exactly what Dworkin is asserting and denying in these re-
marks is not entirely clear. He denies that assigning semantic in-
tentions to a group of statesmen or politicians depends on "phe-
nomenological hypotheses," or "hypotheses about individual 
mental states," but concedes that it does "draw on suppositions 
about beliefs and attitudes." In the case of an institution such as 
Congress, it involves "personifying" the institution- treating it 
as if it had intentions-and then "constructing" its intentions by 
making the "best sense" of its use of certain language on a par-
ticular occasion. 104 Dworkin says that this idea of "institutional 
intention" also applies to the Constitution. This suggests that 
the framers as a group should be treated like an institution, 
deemed to have its own semantic intentions distinct from the 
real intentions of its individual members, to be constructed in 
much the same way as a congressional intention. 
But this leaves much that is unclear. In Law's Empire, 
Dworkin insisted that the intentions ascribed to a statute should, 
if possible, be consistent with the morally best set of principles to 
which the contemporary community could be deemed to be 
101. Arduous Virtue of Fidelity at1252-53 (cited in note 6). 
102. Reflections on Fidelity atl815 (cited in note 4). 
103. Arduous Vinue of Fidelity at1259 (cited in note 6). 
104. See discussion at p. 57-58. 
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committed by virtue of its legal practices as a whole. For this 
reason, he described the process of ascribing intention to a stat-
ute, not as making the "best sense" of its original enactment, but 
rather as making it "the best that it can be." Therefore, he 
treated historical evidence about popular opinion and formal 
statements of purpose when the statute was enacted as much less 
important than the construction of a morally attractive set of 
principlesconsistent with both the statute's words and the rest of 
the law as a whole. But now he insists that the construction of 
the framer's semantic intentions depends on making "the best 
sense" of their decision to adopt the language of the Constitu-
tion. Moreover, this exercise is constrained by historical evi-
dence of what meanings and purposes were in fact influential at 
that time. It is not a matter of constructing the best possible jus-
tification for the framers' language, regardless of their attitudes. 
Dworkin says that "[w]e cannot capture a statesman's efforts to 
lay down a general constitutional principle by attributing to him 
something neither he nor we could recognize as a candidate for 
that role."105 It is not clear why Dworkin now insists that seman-
tic intentions that are "constructed," and ascribed to a quasi-
institution which cannot really have intentions, must possess this 
kind of historical plausibility. Why does he argue that, although 
their construction is not concerned with what was in fact in the 
minds of individual framers, it is constrained by what could have 
been in their minds? 
This is all quite puzzling. But whatever the explanation, the 
important point is that Dworkin now treats as crucial the same 
kind of historical evidence that interests semantic originalists. 
While denying that he is concerned with the framers' "individual 
mental states," the process by which he "constructs" their se-
mantic intentions seems indistinguishable from the one that in-
telligent semantic originalists would employ. He is a virtual se-
mantic originalist, even if, strictly speaking, he is not a real one. 
I say "even if," because it is not clear that a "real" semantic 
originalist must conceive of semantic intentions as individual 
mental states, rather than adopting Dworkin's conception of 
them. 
A second reason why Dworkin might still deny that he is an 
originalist of any kind is that, for him, identifying the original 
law-makers' "semantic intentions" is only the first step in the 
l 05. Freedom's Law at 9 (cited in note 1 ). 
2000] DWORKIN AS AN ORIG/NALIST 73 
task of interpreting the law they made. He reiterates one of the 
central themes of Law's Empire: 
[A]ny strategy of constitutional argument that aims at overall 
constitutional integrity must search for answers that mesh 
well enough with our practices and traditions-that find 
enough foothold in our continuing history as well as in the 
Constitution's text-so that those answers can plausibly be 
taken to describe our commitments as a nation.106 
Therefore, "constitutional interpretation must take into account 
past legal and political practice as well as what the framers them-
selves intended to say." The principle of integrity requires 
judges to read the Constitution "as expressing any particular 
moral judgment ... [only] if they find it consistent in principle 
with ... the dominant lines of past constitutional interpretation 
by other judges. They must regard themselves as partners with 
other officials, past and future, who together elaborate a coher-
ent constitutional morality, and they must take care to see that 
what they contribute fits with the rest. "107 This requirement gov-
erns judgments about abstract as well as particular questions: 
The First Amendment, like the other great clauses of the Bill 
of Rights ... cannot be applied to concrete cases except by as-
signing some overall point or purpose to the amendment's ab-
stract guarantee .... This is not just a matter of asking what 
the statesmen who drafted, debated, and adopted the First 
Amendment thought their clauses would accomplish. Con-
temporary lawyers and judges must try to find a political justi-
fication of the First Amendment that fits most past constitu-
tional practice, including past decisions of the Supreme Court, 
and also provides a compelling reason why we should grant 
freedom of Sgfech such a special and privileged place among 
our liberties. 
This does significantly reduce the conclusiveness of the framers' 
semantic intentions. But it does not in itself disqualify Dworkin 
from being labeled an originalist. Even card-carrying originalists 
concede that constitutional interpretation is governed by the 
doctrine of stare decisis, which may require an erroneous inter-
pretation of a provision to be preferred to its correct interpreta-
tion, in effect changing the Constitution. No sensible originalist 
106. Arduous Virtue of Fidelity at 1254 (cited in note 6); sec also id. at 1249-50, 1260. 
107. Freedom's Law at 9-10 (cited in note 1); see also Arduous Vinue of Fidelity at 
1249-50 (cited in note 6); Reflections on Fidelity at 1815 (cited in note 4). 
108. Freedom's Law at 199 (cited in note 1). 
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maintains that constitutional interpretation turns exclusively on 
the framers' semantic intentions, or that they always prevail over 
other relevant considerations. Of course, it may be that those 
intentions have less influence or weight within Dworkin's meth-
odology compared with mainstream originalism. But this is 
doubtful, because in this respect there has been a marked change 
of emphasis in his methodology since Law's Empire. 
In Law's Empire, as we have seen, Dworkin continually 
emphasized the diminishing relevance of the framers' intentions 
as time goes by. According to the interpretive methodology he 
then endorsed, an interpretation had to fit "the text" of the Con-
stitution, but did not have to fit the framers' intentions. By "the 
text," he seems to have meant "what the plain words ... plainly 
require."109 But now that he distinguishes "semantic" intentions 
from "expectation" intentions, "the text" is no longer distinct 
from the framers' intentions. 
[A] text is not just a series of letters and spaces: It consists of 
propositions, and we cannot give a text "primacy" -or in-
deed, any place at all-without a semantic interpretation, that 
is, an interpretation that specifies what (if anything) the let-
ters and spaces mean. Until we have interpreted the letters 
and spaces in that way, we can have no idea what is or is not 
"irreconcilable" with the text.... We decide what proposi-
tions a text contains by assigning semantic intentions to those 
who made the text.110 
He is scornful of the view (popular among non-originalists) that 
any interpretation can be said to fit the text provided only that 
"the string of characters and spaces that make up the text could 
be used, in some circumstances or other, to express the proposi-
tion the interpretation deploys," whether or not the authors in-
tended the text to express it. "(T]hat odd interpretive strategy is 
arbitrary and unmotivated in legal or political principle .... 
Would it not be equally sensible to say, instead, that the text 
must be primary in the anagram sense: that it can be understood 
as forbidding anything that the letters in it can be rearranged to 
forbid?"'" 
So the framers' semantic intentions are not optional extras, 
which may or may not be taken into account in addition to the 
text: they help fix what the text is. Dworkin says that "the text 
109. Law's Empire at 338 (cited in note 29). 
110. Arduous Virtue of Fidelity at 1260 (cited in note 6). 
111. ld. at 1260-61. 
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must have a very important role: We must aim at a set of consti-
tutional principles that we can defend as consistent with the most 
plausible interpretation we have of what the text itself says, and 
be very reluctant to settle for anything else."112 Since the fram-
ers' semantic intentions determine "what the text itself says,"113 
this amounts to the view that the semantic intentions of the 
framers have such "a very important role" that we must be "very 
reluctant" to settle for any interpretation that is inconsistent 
with them. In other words, even if the text is subjected to con-
structive interpretation, as prescribed in Law's Empire, the re-
quirement that any such interpretation should fit the text, under-
stood as expressing the framers' semantic intentions, means that 
those intentions will act as a heavy anchor restraining the ability 
of the interpreter to make the text "the best it can be." As a re-
sult, while Dworkin agrees that "practice and precedent can, in 
principle, supersede even so basic a piece of interpretive data as 
the Constitution's text" (as determined by the framers' semantic 
intentions), he apparently now believes that it does so only 
rarely.114 That is exactly what moderate or semantic originalists 
believe. 
There has been a dramatic change in Dworkin's attitude 
towards the idea that the meaning of a statute, or the Constitu-
tion, can legitimately change along with community attitudes 
and values. As we have seen, Dworkin in Law's Empire explic-
itly accepted this idea. He firmly rejected the notion that a stat-
ute is enacted at a canonical moment that fixes "all the meaning 
it ever has. "115 What intention or purpose should be ascribed to a 
statute depends largely on what principled commitments can 
plausibly be ascribed to the community today, even if they have 
changed since the statute's enactment. "Hercules," he said, "in-
terprets not just the statute's text but its life, the process that be-
gins before it becomes law and extends far beyond that moment. 
He aims to make the best he can of this continuing story, and his 
interpretation therefore changes as the story develops."116 Her-
112. Id. at 1260. 
113. "(T)hc semantic intentions of historical statesmen inevitably fix what the docu-
ment they made says." Id. at 1255. 
114. Id. at 1250 ("on some occasions"); sec also id. at 1260. Elsewhere he says: "We 
make constant assumptions about the framers' linguistic [i.e., semantic] intentions, and 
we never contradict these in our views about what the Constitution says:" Freedom's 
lAw at 291 (cited in note 1) (emphasis added). This seems to overstate his reliance on 
semantic intentions. 
115. lAw's Empire at 316,348 (cited in note 29). 
116. Id. at 348. 
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cules does not covertly amend old statutes to suit new times, but 
"recognizes what the old statutes have since become." 117 
To say that a statute has a "life" is to invoke the metaphor 
of statutes as "living," and to speak of what old statutes "have 
become" is to say that their meaning sometimes changes over 
time. It is therefore startling to find Dworkin now contemptu-
ously rejecting the thesis that, in his words, constitutional provi-
sions "are chameleons which change their meaning to conform 
to the needs and spirit of new times." He says that this thesis "is 
hardly even intelligible, and I know of no prominent contempo-
rary judge or scholar who holds anything like it."ns He claims 
that the judges who described the American Constitution as 
something "living" were merely using a metaphor to describe the 
result of interpreting certain constitutional rights as abstract 
principles rather than concrete rules. "[T)he application of these 
abstract principles to particular cases, which takes fresh judg-
ment, must be continually reviewed, not in an attempt to find 
substitutes for what the Constitution says, but out of respect for 
what it says" -which, as we have seen, is what the framers in-
tended it to say.n9 "[I)f we read the abstract clauses ... to say 
what their authors intended them to say ... then judges must 
treat these clauses as enacting abstract moral principles and must 
therefore exercise moral judgment in deciding what they really 
require. That does not mean ignoring ... historical integrity or 
morphing the Constitution."120 Dworkin here returns to the posi-
tion he adopted in The Forum of Principle, namely, that in en-
forcing these abstract principles "judges must make substantive 
decisions of political morality not in place of judgments made by 
the 'Framers' but rather in service of those judgments."121 
Dworkin could have chosen to say that, although the 
meaning of a statute or Constitution can evolve over time, it has 
not done so in the case of these constitutional provisions because 
the community has never abandoned the abstract principles they 
lay down. But he does not say this: he does not say that the 
meanings of these provisions in principle could have, but in fact 
117. ld. 
118. Comment on Scalia at 122 (cited in note 1). See also Freedom's Law at 4 (cited 
in note 1 ), where he disapproves of liberal descriptions of the Constitution as a "living" 
document that "must be 'brought up to date' to match new circumstances and sensibili-
ties." He says that "this account of the argument was never accurate." ld. 
119. Comment on Scalia at 122 (cited in note 1). Sec also Arduous Virtue of Fidelity 
at 1253 (cited in note 6). 
120. Comment on Scalia at 126 (cited in note 1). 
121. The Forum of Principle at 49 (cited in note 16). 
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have not, evolved over time. He says, instead, that the idea that 
constitutional provisions "change their meaning to conform to 
the needs and spirit of new times" is "hardly even intelligible." 
This is an emphatic rejection of non-originalism as it is usually 
understood. 
Dworkin adds that "some of what I have written might 
strike [Justice Antonin] Scalia as saying that the Constitution it-
self changes, though I meant the opposite."122 This is astonishing 
because, as we have seen, much of what Dworkin wrote in Law's 
Empire not only might, but should, strike Scalia as saying that 
the Constitution changes. Consider, for example, Dworkin's ex-
planations of the decision in Brown v Board of Education. In 
Law's Empire, he said that a particular conception of what kind 
of racial discrimination the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
might have been sound "at some time in our history," such as 
when Plessy v Ferguson was decided, but "is not adequate now, 
nor was it in 1954," when Plessy was overruled by Brown, be-
cause it had by then become inconsistent with "deep and domi-
nant contemporary opinion."123 But now he says that "as the Su-
preme Court held, the best understanding of [the Framers'] 
semantic intentions supposes that they meant to, and did, lay 
down a general principle of political morality which ~t had be-
come clear by 1954) condemns racial segregation."1 4 So ac-
cording to his explanation in Law's Empire, the content of the 
Fourteenth Amendment may have changed between Plessy and 
Brown (although he now says that he "meant the opposite"). 
But according to his more recent explanation, it has not changed: 
the Court in Brown applied the general principle that the fram-
ers originally laid down, which it then understood more clearly 
than it had in Plessy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Dworkin seems to have realized the importance of the dis-
tinction between semantic and expectation intentions after he 
wrote Law's Empire, during the debates over Robert Bork's 
nomination to the Supreme Court. It is very difficult to know 
just how radically his arguments in Law's Empire would have to 
be modified in order to accommodate the distinction. The cri-
tique of the speaker's meaning theory would have to be scaled 
122. Comment on Scalia at 122 (cited in note 1). 
123. Law's Empire at 387-88 (cited in note 29). 
124. Comment on Scalia at 119 (cited in note 1). 
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down, so that it attacked theories concerned only with either the 
actual mental states of individual law-makers, or expectation 
rather than semantic intentions. The methodology of construc-
tive interpretation would have to be changed, so as to operate on 
a text considered not just as a sequence of words, but as an ex-
pression of its framers' semantic intentions. I very much doubt 
that Dworkin could plausibly argue that this is what he meant at 
the time, and that his current emphasis on semantic intentions is 
consistent with everything in Law's Empire. But even if he 
could, that would merely show that he has been a kind of origi-
nalist all along.125 
125. The version of originalism to which Dworkin now subscribes is very similar t? 
one I have defended elsewhere in the Australian context, which I call "'moderate ongl-
nalism": see my Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation, 25 Fed. L. Rev. 1 (1997). 
But that is another story. 
